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ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS: SHIFTING 
THE PRIV ACY BURDEN A WAY FROM WITNESSES AND 
VICTIMS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On June 14, 2005 the Maryland Court of Appeals ordered that 
information which has historically been available in hard copy at 
courthouses will also be made available electronically. I This 
decision came over the protests of prosecutors and victims' rights 
advocates who feared that the heightened availability would further 
enable victim and witness intimidation. 2 Prosecutors raised 
concerns about the differences between electronic and traditional 
access to court records. 3 According to Baltimore City State's 
Attorney Patricia C. Jessamy, "[t]here's a marked difference 
between going to a courthouse and having to interact face to face 
to get the information and doing it anonymously at a computer 
terminal. ,,4 
Roberta Roper, the founder of the Maryland Crime Victims' 
Resource Center, urged the court to maintain the existing block 
which disallowed "the electronic dissemination of personal 
information of crime victims and witnesses."s Ms. Roper argued 
that the public interest concern of protecting the dignity and safety 
of victims and witnesses outweighs the countervailing interest of 
making the information available electronically.6 Particularly, Ms. 
Roper pointed out that lifting the block would lead to an increased 
ability to be threatened. 7 
Current practice includes that clerks notify 
victims and witnesses by subpoena or summons 
through the judicial database. Subpoenas and 
summons are often included in the court files. 
However in order to examine these documents, 
those viewing the files will have to sign in and show 
identification to view the court file. If a victim or 
I. Julie Bykowicz, Make Court Data Available Electronically, Judges Order, BALT. 
SUN, June 15, 2005, at 2B. 
2. /d.; Letter from Roberta Roper, Founder, Md. Crime Victims' Res. etr., to The 
Md. Court of Appeals (June 14,2005) (on file with author). 
3. Bykowicz, supra note I. While many commentators are concerned about 
electronic access as it applies to all types of cases in which a person's private 
information is widely disseminated, the focus of this Comment is limited to the 
issue of access to victim and witness telephone numbers and addresses as found 
in criminal court records. 
4. Bykowicz, supra note I. 
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witness is intimidated, an investigation can occur to 
review who had access to the court file to trace and 
identify the potential intimidator. . .. Under the 
new Rules terminal access will provide anonymous 
access to personal information of victims and 
witnesses. With anonymous access, there will be no 
opportunity to trace who may have threatened or 
harmed a victim or witness . . .. There will be a 
chilling effect for victims and witnesses if they 
learn that their personal information will be 
electronically disseminated. 8 
[Vol. 36 
The National Network to End Domestic Violence raised the 
point that the ability to find a victim's name and address on a court 
website allows a batterer or stalker to find the victim. 9 "This 
encroachment on privacy and the resulting threat to personal safety 
will discourage victims of domestic violence from seeking 
protection from their abusers just as it will discourage witnesses 
from helping to end the violence through their testimony." 10 
Despite these· concerns, the Court of Appeals unanimously 
refused to continue the status quo as to a block on electronic 
information of victims and witnesses and fassed Title 16, Chapter 
1000, of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. 1 . 
Under these rules, a witness or victim whose address and 
telephone number has appeared in the court record will carry the 
burden of proactively making certain that his or her personal 
information does not become widely disseminated over the 
Internet. 12 
To achieve this goal of privacy, victims and witnesses of 
domestic violence or those who have obtained a protective order 
may re~uest to have certain information withheld from the public 
record. 1 Other victims and witnesses must file a motion to have 
information withheld. This motion must be sent to the State's 
Attorney and to the defense attorney.14 Before a permanent 
removal of the personal information, the victim or witness will be 
required to attend a hearing at which he must make a case to the 
judge as to why his motion should be granted and his information 
8. Id. 
9. National Network to End Domestic Violence, Public & Internet Access to Court 
Records, Safety Net: The Nat'l Safe & Strategic Tech. Project 1, 2 (on file with 
author). 
10. Id. 
11. Bykowicz, supra note I;· Janet Stidman Eveleth, New Rules Open Court Records 
to Public, MD. B. BULL., Aug. 15,2005, at I. 
12. See infra notes 211-222 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 219-222 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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should be withheld. 15 The victi'm's offender has a right to be 
present at this hearing. 16 
Additionally, ,Maryland law does not provide a mechanism for 
victims to find out about this right to request that their personal 
information be withheld. 17 Neither the court, nor the police are 
required to inform the victims of their right. 18 Victims are forced 
to find a knowledgeable advocate who can help them file the 
aforementioned request and assist them with the hearing that will 
follow. 19 
This is a tremendous burden to place on victims and witnesses. 
This Comment will argue that the burden of proving why the 
telephone numbers and addresses of these people should not be left 
in the public record should be shifted to the defer.dant. 20 
Part II of this Comment will examine the development and 
current state of electronic access to court records. 2 I It will explain 
how electronic access is problematic and how certain jurisdictions 
have moved to keep victim and witness telephone numbers and 
addresses protected from remote access. 22 Part III will discuss the 
regulation of public records as a whole. 23 It will examine the 
courts' attempts to balance public access to court records with the 
privacy interests of victims and witnesses.24 
Part IV will propose a solution that will protect the information 
of victims and witnesses in Maryland, without impeding the 
courts' move towards electronic record keeping. 25 
II. ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS 
This section will examine the electronic access to court records 
through a discussion of the shift away from traditional paper 
records,26 a synofsis of Maryland's implementation of an 
electronic system,2 a discussion of how this shift affects the 
privacy of individuals,28 and an analogy between remote access to 
court records and the electronic dissemination of public 
IS. See infra notes 211-218 and accompanying text. 
16. See MD. R. 16-1009 (indicating that a full adversarial hearing is required before 
granting motion to limit access to record). 
17. See Eveleth, supra note II, at I. 
18. See generally supra note II, at 1. 
19. See generally supra note II, at 1. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26. See infra Part II(A). 
27. See infra Part 11(8). 
28. See infra Part II(C). 
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information that occurred with the passage of Megan's Law 
legislation. 29 It will then examine how other jurisdictions have 
addressed the problem of personal information in the public record 
being disseminated electronically30 and will explain the current 
Maryland Rules and summarize the recently adopted amendments 
to those rules. 31 
A. The Shift from Paper Records to Electronic Records 
Historically, court records were kept using the traditional means 
of notebooks, cabinets, and cardboard boxes. 32 In order to access 
these records, an interested party "had to travel to the local 
courthouse of a particular jurisdiction and scan the columns in a 
court ledger or flip through a narrow drawer of carefully 
alphabetized index cards.,,33 
In recent years, courts have followed technological trends and 
have begun to shift from paper-based systems to electronic 
information systems. 34 
As electronic systems developed, courts were slow to make the 
expensive and complex jump into the age of technology.35 Even 
as the price of computers decreased and the understanding of 
computer systems increased, electronic systems were not overly 
advantageous because the data entered into a computer was 
"trapped in the machine" and could not be shared electronically.36 
As modem networking technologies, such as the Ethernet, 
emerged in the 1980s, a court's desktop computer could be 
connected to a courthouse local area network (LAN), and by the 
early 1990s, courts, as much as they could afford, "were stringing 
their desktop computers together with network access cards and 
Ethernet wiring.,,37 This new technology allowed court Fersonnel 
to access various databases running within a courthouse. 3 
A problem that remained was that the systems "could not 
provide a single integrated view of all the information and data 
relevant to a particular case.,,39 
29. See infra Part II(D). 
30. See infra Part II(E). 
31. See infra Part II(F). 
32. Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems and 
the Question of Public Access to Court Records over the Internet, 79 WASH. L. 
REV. 175, 176 (2004). 
33. Id. at 176-77. 
34. /d. at 177. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 177-78. 
37. Id. at 178. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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For example, to access the schedule for a 
particular case, one might have to consult a stand-
alone calendaring program; to check whether a 
party had filed a document in that same case, a 
stand-alone docketing program; and to confirm 
payment of a court fee, a stand-alone accounting 
program. Before one could achieve a single, 
integrated view of all the information and data 
relevant to a case, one would have to not only 
network all of the computers storing such 
information, but integrate the programs and 
information systems running on these machines as 
well. 4o 
423 
While this integration is a daunting task for the courts, the 
benefits of cost savings, error reduction, and improved 
performance reduce the courts' overall operating expenses. 41 An 
integrated, central database reduces the cost of maintaining and 
changing records. 42 It also reduces the opportunity for clerical 
errors that come with data entry, and court scheduling conflicts can 
easily be identified and prevented. 43 
B. Maryland's Implementation of the Judicial Information 
System and Its Technical Problems 
In 2001, the Maryland General Assembly found a need 
(1) to create a central repository for criminal 
history record information; (2) to require the 
reporting of accurate, relevant, and current criminal 
history record information to the central repository 
by all criminal justice units; (3) to ensure that 
criminal history record information is kept accurate 
and current; and (4) to prohibit the improper 
dissemination of criminal history record 
information. 44 
The Assembly then set out to establish "an accurate and 
efficient criminal justice information system" that is consistent 
with both the need for "accurate and current" criminal history 
records, and the right to be free from improper and unwarranted 
intrusions of privacy. 45 
40. [d. at 178-79. 
41. [d. at 179. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 180. 
44. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-202 (West 2001). 
45. ld. § 10-203. 
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In order to achieve these legislative goals, the Maryland 
judiciary currently operates a Judicial Information System (nS or 
"the System,,).46 The JIS "staff develops and maintains State court 
system applications, operates a statewide computer network, and is 
responsible for data center disaster recovery capabilities.,,47 In 
2004, the System operated on a $19.6 million budget. 48 
The System is composed of a mainframe computer for court 
applications, two mInICOmputers for traffic citations and 
disbursement processing, and nine minicomputers which support 
the Uniform Court System. 49 The JIS serves public customers, 
Judicial Data Center personnel, and remote court users. 50 It 
connects users to various units of the judiciary, including the 
Circuit and District Courts, through a Wide Area Network, which 
connects remote court locations to the Uniform Court System. 51 
"The [Uniform Court System] supports case initiation, scheduling, 
disposition, expungement and other record keeping.,,52 
The System and external agencies can be accessed bl seventy-
seven local area networks, through the Internet. 5 These 
transmissions are controlled by a central Internet firewall. 54 
Additionally, the JIS "also operates a server inside its network 
which supports public user dialup inquiries to court information 
from approximately 5,000 paying customers.,,55 
A February 2005 audit of the Maryland JIS made several 
startling findings regarding the security and efficiency of the 
System. The first finding was that "the internal computer network 
was not sufficiently secured from untrusted networks and 
monitoring of network traffic was not adequate.,,56 
The second was that the maintenance and administration of the 
firewall, which works to protect the System from unauthorized 
access, was outdated and inadequate. 57 The third was that the JIS 
communication server was not properly "configured to protect the 
internal network from unauthorized modification.,,58 
46. Audit from Bruce A. Myers, Legislative Auditor, to Members of the Joint Audit 
Comm. (Feb. 10,2005) [hereinafter JIS Audit] (on file with author), available at 
http://www.ola.state.md.us/reports/Fiscal%20Compliance/JIS05.pdf. 









56. Id. at 9. 
57. Id. at 10. 
58. /d. 
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"Specifically, the Systems' communication server had weak or 
non-existent password and account lockout provisi~ns for server 
users. In addition, authenticated users to the server were not 
limited to performing only designated tasks as specified by 
Systems' management."S9 ThIs flaw allowed users to access 
information that they should not be privy to. 60 
Fourth, the measures used to protect two important network 
servers from having their aRplications improperly exposed on the 
Internet were inadequate. I "As a result of these network 
vulnerabilities, these servers were not adequately secured from 
exposures that could result in the loss of data integrity, the 
interruption of key services, and the improper use of these 
servers.,,62 
Fifth, the System allowed individual users to operate under the 
identity of another to gain heightened access privileges.63 Sixth, 
due to certain security inadequacies, changes to critical files "were 
not subject to review and approval by supervisory personnel.,,64 
This condition can easily lead to "unauthorized or erroneous 
changes to mainframe data files," such as court case records.6s 
These findings were observations on the current state of the JIS, 
as of February 2005, and were unrelated to the June 2005 hearing 
on electronic access to court records. However, the findings are 
instructive in considering that maintaining the security of 
electronic court files is a difficult task amidst the imperfect and 
still emerging technology of information systems. 
C. The Shift Jrom Paper to Electronic Records and Its Effect on 
the Interest oj Privacy 
In addition to the technical concerns about the security of the 
JIS, the development of Maryland's judicial information system 
created a system of electronic judicial records, in which it is 
imperative to offer heightened protection to individuals from 
invasions of their privacy. 66 
It is temptingly easy to assume that if one 
applies the same set of rules to electronic judicial 






64. Id. at 12. 
65. Id. 
66. Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and 
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 314-15 
(2004). 
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it will result in the same balance between the 
various competing policies. Unfortunately, this is 
not the case. The assumption of parity represents a 
serious misunderstanding of the differences 
between paper records and electronic records. 
When the same rules that have been worked out for 
the world of paper records are applied to electronic 
records, the result does not preserve the balance 
worked out between competing policies in the 
world of paper records, but dramatically alters that 
balance. It shifts the balance away from individual 
privacy, producing little if any benefit on the side of 
judicial accountability.67 
There is a basic distinction between paper records and 
electronic records that the Maryland General Assembly has been 
slow to address in its move toward open electronic 
dissemination. 68 The difference is that "practical obscurity" 
existed in the traditional systems, but not in the systems that allow 
electronic access. 69 
While court records have always been public, the way that they 
were kept allowed them to retain a high degree of "practical 
obscurity.,,7o In the past, personal information found in a court 
record was public in that it could be accessed by anyone, not in the 
sense that it could easily be accessed by anyone with a fleeting 
interest. 71 "Only those with a relatively strong interest in the 
information would take time out of their day, wait in line at the 
clerk's office, fill out the necessary forms, and pay the necessary 
copy charges."n With the records available online, however, 
anyone can access the information with incredible ease. 73 
"The privacy protection that currently exists for public records 
is largely designed for a world of paper records and has been slow 
to adapt to an age where information can be downloaded from the 
Internet in an instant." 74 
67. [d.at315. 
68. But see infra Part II(F)(2). 
69. Winn, supra note 66, at 316 (quoting United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters 




73. [d. Currently, criminal court records are available at http://casesearch.courts. 
state.md.us/inquiry/. While this website is in its infancy and search results are 
not as in-depth as they may be in the future, victim names are being disseminated 
over the Internet. 
74. Daniell. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1172 (2002). 
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The Maryland Rules in Title 16, Chapter 1000, create a 
heightened access to case records through electronic means, but do 
not temper this with a heightened security for victims and 
witnesses whose private information is included in the records. 75 
While the case law on this matter is limited, the Supreme Court of 
Florida, in a 2002 decision, held that "digital storage and transfer 
of information changes how information can be manipulated and 
retrieved. Previously obscure information can be located quickly 
and anonymously for essentially no COSt.,,76 It is this inherent 
difference between paper files and electronic files that raised 
concerns for the Florida Supreme Court. 77 
Until recently, public records were difficult to 
access. For a long time, public records were only 
available locally. Finding information about a 
person often involved a treasure hunt around the 
country to a series of local offices to dig up records. 
But with the Internet revolution, public records can 
be easily obtained and searched from anywhere. 78 
D. Electronic Access to Public Records In Terms of Megan's Law 
The inherent privacy issue that is attached to the Internet 
dissemination of public records was extrapolated in the passage 
and implementation of Megan's Law. 79 
The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act "conditions certain federal law 
enforcement funding on the States' adoption of sex offender 
registration laws and sets mimmum standards for state 
programs.,,80 These registration laws are known as Megan's Laws; 
by 1996 every state and the District of Columbia had enacted some 
form of Megan's Law. 8l 
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court examined Alaska's 
variation of Megan's Law. 82 Alaska's version of the law requires 
that a sex offender register with local law enforcement authorities, 
providing "his name, aliases, identifying features, address, place of 
75. See infra note 127. 
76. In re Report & Recommendations of the Judicial Mgmt. Council of Fla. on 
Privacy & Elec. Access to Court Records, 832 So. 2d 712, 714 (Fla. 2002). 
77. /d. 
78. Solove, supra note 74, at 1139. 
79. See infra discussion accompanying notes 89-96. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § l4071(g)(2)(A) (2006); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90 (2003). 
81. Smith, 538 U.S. at 89-90. The laws are named for "Megan Kanka[,] a seven-
year-old New Jersey girl who was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1994 by a 
neighbor who, unknown to the victim's family, had prior convictions for sex 
offenses against children." [d. at 89. 
82. /d. at 90. 
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employment, date of birth, conviction information, driver's license 
number, information about vehicles to which he has access, and 
postconviction treatment history.,,83 Those who fail to comply 
with these regulations are subject to criminal prosecution. 84 
The information provided is maintained in a central registry for 
sex offenders and is made available to the pUblic.85 "The Act does 
not specify the means by which the registry information must be 
made public. Alaska has chosen to make most of the non-
confidential information available on the Internet.,,86 
In Smith v. Doe, two men were separately convicted of sex 
offenses. After completing rehabilitative programs, they were 
required to submit personal information to the state for the purpose 
of the sex offender registry. 87 Among other things, the men argued 
that the widespread dissemination of their conviction was punitive 
and for the purpose of further humiliation. 88 
In an amicus brief, the Electronic Privacy Information Center89 
(EPIC) argued that 
The Alaska Megan's Law statute permits 
internet dissemination of stigmatizing information 
collected from released offenders by the state by 
mandating that the information in the registry be 
available "for any purpose ... to any person." 
Because government posting of registry information 
makes this information widely available to 
individuals not living in geographic proximity to the 
registrant, the punishment imposed by the statute is 
excessive.9o 
While the amicus concedes that society has the ability to limit 
the privacy rights of criminals, it argues that the restrictions should 
not be more invasive than is necessary to achieve the state's 
purpose. 91 Widespread Internet dissemination goes beyond the 
purpose of locally identifying community sex offenders. 92 
83. Id. (construing ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.01O(a)-(b) (2004)). 
84. Id. (construing ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.835-.840 (2004)). 
85. Id. at 90-91. 
86. Id. at 91. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 97. 
89. "[EPIC] is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. that was 
established to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to 
protect privacy, the First Amendment, and other constitutional values." Brief for 
Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 1, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-729), 2002 WL 1822146. 
90. !d. at 1-2 (footnote omitted). 
91. Id. at 2-3. 
92. See id. at 7-10. 
2007) Electronic Access to Court Records 429 
The Supreme Court addressed this contention and held that 
"[ w ]idespread public access is necessary for the efficacy of the 
scheme" and "[t]he fact that Alaska posts the information on the 
Internet does not alter [this] conclusion.,,93 
The Court's reasoning, however, rested on the fact that there 
was a compelling state interest in making public the information of 
sex offenders. 94 Public safety was more heavily weighted in a 
balancing test with the encroachment on the privacy of the 
offenders. 95 
Conversely, in the case of the dissemination of the private 
information of victims and witnesses, it is difficult to envision a 
similar outcome in the balancing between the safety and privacy of 
victims and the government incentive of judicial ease. 
Victims and witnesses are distinguishable from the criminally 
convicted in that the state does not have the right to limit their 
privacy and there is no overriding government interest in making 
their whereabouts known to the public. 96 
E. Other Jurisdictions 
Some jurisdictions have recognized the problematic nature of 
the electronic dissemination of victim and witness information and 
have adjusted their rules accordingly.97 
1. Minnesota 
Rule Eight of the Minnesota Rules of Public Access to Records 
of the Judicial Branch deals with the issue of electronic access.98 
Subsection One of the Rule allows open access to public records in 
the courthouse.99 Subsection Two addresses the "remote access to 
electronic records."IOO It specifies that "a custodian that maintains 
the following electronic case records must provide remote 
93. Smith, 538 U.S. at 99. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See Stacy R. Horth-Neubert, In the Hot Box and on the Tube: Witnesses Interests 
in Televised Trials, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 166-67 & n.7 (1997); Kimberly A. 
Murphy, Comment, The Use of Federal Writs of Habeas Corpus to Release the 
Obligation to Report Under State Sex Offender Statutes: Are Defendants "In 
Custody" for Purposes of Habeas Corpus Review?, 2000 MICH. ST. LREV. 513, 
passim (2000). 
97. See discussion infra Part II(E)(1)-(3). 
98. Minn. R. Pub. Access to Records of the Jud. Br., R. 8 (2005). 
99. Id. at 8.1 ("Upon request to a custodian, a person shall be allowed to inspect or to 
obtain copies of original versions of records that are accessible to the public in 
the place where such records are normally kept, during regular working hours."). 
100. Id. at 8.2. 
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electronic access to those records to the extent that the custodian 
has the resources and technical capacity to do SO."IOI 
The rule goes on to make the following exceptions: 
Notwithstanding Rule 8, subd. 2(a), the public 
shall not have remote access to the following data in 
an electronic case record with regard to parties or 
their family members, jurors, witnesses, or victims 
of a criminal or delinquent act: (1) social security 
numbers and employer identification numbers; (2) 
street addresses; (3) telephone numbers; (4) 
financial account numbers; and (5) in the cases of a 
juror, witness, or victim of a criminal or delinquent 
act, information that either specifically identifies the 
individual or from which the identity of the 
individual could be ascertained. 102 
The rule defines remote access as "information in a court record 
[that] can be electronically searched, inspected, or copied without 
the need to physically visit a court facility." 103 
The language of the rule makes clear that the state of Minnesota 
has recognized the distinction between the ability to access court 
records from afar on the Internet and from being forced to 
physically visit the courthouse to obtain information found in court 
records, and has tempered this difference with limited access to on-
line records. 104 
2. Colorado 
On April 8, 2005, the Colorado Judicial Department adopted a 
new policy regarding the public's access to court records. 1O The 
policy came after "[a] Public Access Committee was established 
... to develop policy regarding the information to be released to 
the public from court records including court records maintained in 
the Integrated Colorado Online Network ... system." 106 
The Colorado policy, like the Minnesota Rules, defines remote 
access as "the ability to electronically search, inspect, or copy 
information in a court record without the need to physically visit 
the Judiciary Branch facility or location where the court record is 
maintained." 1 07 
10 1. Id. at 8.2(a). 
102. ld. at 8.2(b). 
103. ld. at 8.2(d). 
104. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
105. Colo. Judicial Dep't, Public Access to Court Records (Apr. 8,2005). 
106. ld. § 3.00(a). 
107. ld. § 3.30. 
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According to the policy, court records are assumed to be subject 
to remote access, except as otherwise specified. lOS The judiciary 
makes very clear in its list of specifications that certain types of 
information will not be open to the public by any means. 109 It also 
specifies what types of information will be available at the 
courthouse, but not through remote access. 110 
Most specifically, information regarding victims and witnesses 
is only available at the courthouse, not through remote access. III 
3. Wisconsin 
The Wisconsin court system employs a system called 
Wisconsin Circuit Court Access (WCCA) which, in conjunction 
with the Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP), 
allows public Internet access to court records. I 12 The disclosure 
policy governs the privacy of victims, witnesses and jurors by 
recommending "that court personnel entering information 
concerning crime victims into court documents use initials and 
dates of birth rather than full names whenever doing so would not 
defeat the purpose of the court document." 113 
The Wisconsin policy is different from Colorado's and 
Minnesota's in that it does not protect victims and witnesses by 
removing their personal information from court records. I 14 
However, the policy states that court personnel should avoid 
entering information that is not necessary to the purpose of the 
court record. I 15 While this approach leaves open the possibility for 
108. Id. § 4.20. 
109. Id. § 4.60(a). These records that are not open to the public include: 
Probation [ ] files, Social Security Numbers (as collected by the court 
on court issued or standardized forms), Deposited Wills, Victim's 
name or identifying information in sexual assault case[s], 
Drug/Alcohol treatment information, Paternity tests, cases and 
records, Genetic testing, HIV / AIDS testing information, Medical, 
mental health sociological, intelligence testing, Scholastic 
achievement data on individuals, Adoption Records, Relinquishment 
Cases, Juvenile Delinquency Cases, Dependency & Neglect Records, 
Mental Health Cases, Expunged Records, Sealed files, data or 
information, Files/field/codes concerning the deliberative process, 
Draft opinions, notes or internal memos, Driver History, Judicial 
bypass cases, Juror questionnaires, CBI criminal background check 
reports. 
Id. 
llO. Id. § 4.60(b). The personal information of the crime victims is not available in 
electronic format. Id. 
Ill. Id. 
112. Wisc. Policy on Disclosure of Public Information Over the Internet, 
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/AB0304.xsl (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
I IS. Id. 
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error by court personnel, it still recognizes the vulnerability and 
importance of the privacy of victims and witnesses. 116 
F. Maryland Rules 
Title 16, Chapter 1000, of the Maryland Rules is the applicable 
authority in terms of guarding the personal information of victims 
and witnesses from electronic dissemination. 117 
Rule 16-1001 defines a court record as "( 1) an administrative 
record; (2) a business license record; (3) a case record; or (4) a 
notice record." 118 This Comment is focused on case records, 
which are "document[s], information, or other thing[s] that [are] 
collected, received, or maintained by a court in connection with 
one or more specific judicial actions or proceedings." 119 More 
narrowly, this Comment is concerned with the telephone numbers 
and addresses of victims and witnesses which are included in case 
records as a matter of course. 120 
As a ?:eneral policy, these rules provide a presumption of "-
openness. 21 However, Rule 16-1005 allows the following 
exceptions: 
[A] custodian shall deny inspection of a case record 
or any part of a case record if inspection would be 
contrary to: 
(1) The Constitution of the United States, a Federal 
statute, or a Federal regulation adopted under a 
Federal statute and having the force of law; 
(2) The Maryland Constitution; 
(3) A provision of the Maryland Public Information 
Act that is expressly adopted in the Rules in this 
Chapter; 
(4) A rule adopted by the Court of Appeals; or 
(5) An order entered by the court having custody of 
the case record or by any higher court having 
jurisdiction over 
(A) the case record, or 
(B) the person seeking inspection of the case 
record. 122 
116. See generally supra notes 114-115. 
117. MD. R. 16-1001 to -1009. 
118. MD. R. 16-1001. 
119. Id. 
120. Letter from Roberta Roper, supra note 2. 
121. MD. R. 16-1002. 
122. MD. R. 16-1005. 
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The Rules also specify certain categories of case records which 
carry an automatic prohibition of inspection. 123 These categories 
include adoption and guardianship actions, certain delinquency 
hearings, certain records pertaining to a marriage license, any case 
records concerning child abuse or neglect, confidential attorney 
grievance matters, and Pro Bono Legal Service Reports. 124 
Additionally, in criminal actions, various types of information, 
including expunged records, certain records pertaining to search 
and arrest warrants, records of spousal privilege, records 
containing certain medical information, and records of income tax 
returns carry a required denial of inspection. 125 
Rule 16-1007 further denies the inspection of specific 
information in case records if the inspection would reveal: 
(a) The name, address, telephone number, e-
mail address, or place of employment of a person 
who reports the abuse of a vulnerable adult. . .. (b) 
. . . the home address or telephone number of an 
employee of the State or a political subdivision of 
the State. (c) Any part of the social security or 
Federal Identification Number of an individual, 
other than the last four digits. (d) Information about 
a person who has received a copy of a sex 
offender's or sexual predator's registration 
statement. 126 
Rule 16-1008 states that "a court record that is kept in electronic 
form is open to inspection to the same extent that the record would 
be open to inspection in paper form." 127 The Rule further specifies 
that, for the purpose of providing electronic access to court 
records, including case records, the court is authorized 
(A) to convert paper court records into electronic 
court records; (B) to create new electronic records, 
databases, programs, or computer systems; (C) to 
provide computer terminals or other equipment for 
use by the public; (D) to create the ability to inspect 
or copy court records through remote access; or (E) 
to convert, supplement, modify, or replace an 
existing electronic storage or retrieval system. 128 
123. MD. R. 16-1006. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. MD. R. 16-1007. 
127. MD. R. 16-1008(a)(l). 
128. MD. R. 16-1008(a)(2). 
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The Rule also defines remote access as the availability to the 
public throu§h "dial-up modem, web site access, or other 
technology." 1 9 
1. Recently Adopted Amendments to the Maryland Rules 
In its One Hundred Fifty-Sixth Report to the Court of 
Appeals, the Rules Committee proposed amendments to Rule 16-
1008. 130 "The proposed amendments to Rule 16-1008 limit remote 
access to identifying information of victims and nonparty 
witnesses in criminal cases." 131 The Rules Committee also 
recommended that the amendments be adopted immediately so that 
the rule would become effective before the identifying information 
could be posted on the Internet. 132 
The amendments, which were approved by the Court of 
Appeals on March 7, 2006, and are to go into effect on July 1, 
2006, add the following provision to Rule 16-1008: 
Except for identifying information relating to 
law enforcement officers, other public officials 
acting in their official capacity, and expert 
witnesses, a custodian shall prevent remote access 
to the address, telephone number, date of birth, e-
mail address, and place of employment of a victim 
or nonparty witness in (1) a criminal action. 133 
This amendment limits the remote access of victim and witness 
information by making the rule subject to specific, limiting 
language. 134 
This amendment followed consideration of "the request of the 
Maryland Crime Victims' Resource Center, Inc. and the Maryland 
State's Attorneys Association." 135 The Reporter's Note 
summarized the reasoning: 
Victims' representatives and prosecutors fear 
that remote access to VIctIm and witness 
information in criminal cases would facilitate and 
increase the ease with which a person from 
anywhere in the world, using an internet search 
engine, could harass, harm, intimidate, stalk, or 
threaten victims and witnesses. The criminal justice 
129. MD. R. 16-1008(a)(4)(B). 
130. 32 Md. Reg. 1819 (Nov. 14,2005). 
131. ld. at 1820. 
132. ld. 
133. 33-7 Md. Reg. 620, 621 (Mar. 31, 2006). 
134. !d. 
135. 32 Md. Reg. 1821 (Reporter's Note). 
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system would be harmed by an increase in the 
already significant reluctance of victims and 
witnesses to report crimes and testify. Remote 
access would have a chilling effect on the reporting 
of rape and other crimes if a victim can forever be 
identified and stigmatized as a ra~e victim by a 
simple name search on the internet. 1 6 
435 
The amendments take the same route as Minnesota rules and 
Colorado policy, by protecting victims and witnesses from having 
their addresses and telephone numbers disseminated 
electronically. I37 
2. Proposed Legislation 
In addition to these amendments to the Court Rules, during the 
2006 Legislative Session, Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. proposed 
legislation that would limit electronic access to victim and witness 
information. 138 Along with the Governor's Bill, Senator Norman 
R. Stone, Jr. and Delegate Joseph F. Vallario, sponsored similar 
bills to protect victim and witness information from electronic 
dissemination. 139 While each of these Bills failed,140 they were 
proposed to prevent electronic access to public records that contain 
the personal information of victims and witnesses. 141 
Like the proposed amendments to the Maryland Rules, these 
Bills were limited to protecting victim and witness information 
from electronic access. 142 However, the problem goes beyond 
remote access. 143 The larger issue is that the heavy burden of 
limiting what information is included in the court record falls upon 
the victims. 144 Forthcoming proposed rule changes should not 
only protect victims and witnesses from improper remote access, 
136. [d. 
137. See discussion supra Part II(E)(l)-(2). 
138. Daniel Ostrovsky, Bill Would Block Access to Some Court Records, THE DAILY 
REC., Jan. 31,2006, at lB. 
139. H.D. 632, 2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006) (withdrawn), available at 
http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/billfilelhb0632.htm; H.D. 323, 2006 Leg., 421 st 
Sess. (Md. 2006) (Senate took no action after Apr. 6, 2006), available at 
http://m1is.state.md.us/2006rs/billfilelhb0323.htm; S. 232, 2006 Leg., 421 st Sess. 
(Md. 2006) (Senate took no action after Jan. 31, 2006; House took no action), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/billfile/sb0232.htm; S. 162,2006 Leg., 
421 st Sess. (Md. 2006) (Senate took no action after Jan. 31, 2006; House took no 
action), available at http://m1is.state.md.us/2006rs/billfile/sbOI62.htm. The 
differences between these bills are immaterial to the scope of this Comment. 
140. See supra note 139. 
141. !d. 
142. [d. 
143. See infra Part III. 
144. See infra Part IV. 
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but also from traditional courthouse access to their personal 
infonnation. 145 
III. THE"REGULATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS 
This section will first examine the regulation of public records 
through a discussion of how public records were examined at 
common law,146 and how the passage of the Freedom of 
Infonnation Act affected the open examination of co~rt records. 147 
Next, it will examine the jurisprudence of striking a balance 
between public access and privacy.148 It will follow with a 
discussion of legislation passed to protect personal infonnation that 
had become public through state departments of motor vehicles. 149 
It will conclude with a discussion of Maryland's laws concerning 
public access to court records, including the applicable discovery 
rules. 150 
A. Common Law 
Following English common law, early u.S. courts n6nnally 
only granted access to non-court records where there was a special 
interest. 151 "Today, however, this discretion has been significantly 
reduced by state and federal freedom of infonnation laws." 152 
More specifically, the public's ability to inspect court records 
has traditionally been open and includes "a general right to inspect 
and copy public records and documents, including judicial records 
and documents." 153 
The Supreme Court has, however, provided discretion to the 
court to protect privacy in court files by holding that "[i]t is 
uncontested ... that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is 
not absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own 
records and files and access has been denied where court files 
might have become a vehicle for improper purposes." 154 
145. See infra Part IV. 
146. Infra Part III(A). 
147. Infra Part Ill(B). 
148. Infra Part III(C). 
149. Infra Part Ill(D). 
150. Infra Part III(E). 
151. Solove, supra note 74, at 1155. 
152. Id. at 1156. 
153. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Solove, supra note 
74, at 1156. 
154. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. 
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Despite this discretion, the presumption is in favor of open 
access to court records. 155 This places a burden on the party 
seeking confidentiality. 156 
B. The Freedom of Information Act 
In 1966, the passage of the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), and the similar state legislation that followed, created a 
"strong commitment to openness and transparency.,,157 "The 
Freedom of Information Act of 1966 ... provides that Government 
agencies shall make available to the public a broad spectrum of 
information." 158 
The FOIA was passed to tighten uR ambiguities that existed 
under the previo·us applicable statute. I 9 "The provisions of the 
Freedom of Information Act stand in sharp relief against those of 
[the former statute]." 160 The FOIA was "plainly intended to set up 
concrete, workable standards for determining whether particular 
material may be withheld or must be disclosed." 161 
The FOIA made all public records as open as court records had 
been under the common law. 162 The basic congressional purpose 
of the Act was to reflect "a general philosophy of full agency 
disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated 
statutory language.,,163 Its effect on access to court records was to 
codify the presumption of openness. 164 This rsresumption 
continues today and is evident in the Maryland Rules. I 5 
155. Solove, supra note 74, at 1158 (citing United States v. EI-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 
159 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the public has a presumptive right of access to 
court records); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(same); SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); 
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d I, 13 (1st Cir. 1986) (same). 
156. Solove, supra note 74, at 1158 (citing FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 
F.2d 404, 408-11 (I st Cir. 1987) ("[T]hose seeking to keep the datum hidden 
from view ... must carry the devoir of persuasion.")). 
157. Solove, supra note 74, at 1161. 
158. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 74 (1973), superseded by statute on other grounds as 
stated in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
159. Jd. at 79. 
160. Jd. 
161. Jd. 
162. See id. 
163. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965). 
164. Jd. 
165. See infra notes 210-217. 
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C. The Balance Between Privacy and Public Access 
1. The Supreme Court has Held that Privacy Outweighs Public 
Access 
Despite the general presumption of openness, "[t]he Supreme 
Court has consistently found that the right to privacy outweighs the 
public's right to access.,,166 In United States Department of Justice 
v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,167 the Court 
held that the disclosure of an FBI rap-sheet to a third party, was an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy of the subject of the rap-sheet. 168 
The rationale hinged on the existence of specific statutory and 
regulatory provisions that limit the public access to rap-sheet 
information. 169 The Court explained that "[t]his careful and 
limited pattern of authorized rap-sheet disclosure evidenced a 
congressional intent to protect the privacy of the rap-sheet 
subjects." 170 
This case indicates that the Court will carefully balance privacy 
and openness on a case-by-case basis. 171 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has stressed the limitations of openness when 
sensitive personal information is at issue. 172 
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Supreme 
Court made the distinction that President Nixon had a privacy 
interest in records of his communications with his family, but not 
in records of his official duties. 173 
In framing th[ e] balance [between public access 
and the privacy rights of individuals], courts are 
sensitive to protect not only the personal privacy of 
litigants, but also the harm that can come to others, 
such as witnesses, victims, jurors, and other third 
parties, who may have no control over the 
information so disclosed. 174 
166. Victoria S. Salzmann, Are Public Records Really Public?: The Collision Between 
the Right to Privacy and the Release of Public Court Records Over the Internet, 
52 BAYLOR L. REV. 355, 363 (2000). 
167. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
168. ld. at 780. 
169. !d. at 764-65. 
170. ld. at 765. 
171. !d. 
172. See, e.g., infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text. 
173. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
174. Winn, supra note 66, at 312. 
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2. Westinghouse Factors 
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States,175 an 
employer, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, sought to 
protect its employees' medical records from being examined by the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.176 The 
court attempted to balance the interest of maintaining occupational 
safety and health and the privacy of employees. 177 Five factors 
were laid out for consideration in the balance between personal 
privacy and the governmental interest in the disclosure of health 
records. 178 
The factors which should be considered in 
deciding whether an intrusion into an individual's 
privacy is justified are the types of records 
requested, the information it does or might contain, 
the potential for harm in any subsequent 
non consensual disclosure, the Injury from 
disclosure to the relationship in which the record 
was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to 
prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need 
for access, and whether there is an express statutory 
mandate, articulated public policy, or other 
recognizable public interest militating toward 
access. 179 
The court held that the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health should be allowed access to the medical records, 
assuming that the employees were given reasonable notice and an 
opportunity to object. 180 Courts have subsequently applied the 
Westinghouse factors in deciding whether the disclosure of 
personal health information is appropriate. 181 
The examination of the balancing of privacy and the interest in 
inspecting medical records is instructive because it is comparable 
to the balance that is made between privacy and the inspection of 
court records. 182 
Professor Winn has summarized the balance between privacy 
and public access as follows: 
175. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980). 
176. ld. at 572. 
177. ld. 
178. ld. at 578. 
179. ld. 
180. !d. at 582. 
181. Winn, supra note 66, at 313 (citing Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 
376,378,382 (D.N.I. 1990); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.O. Wis. 
1988), ajJ'd without opinion, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
182. ld. 
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The pragmatic reasons supporting the need for 
public access ... are typically balanced against the 
pragmatic reasons supporting the need to restrict 
public access. While courts are vigilant in 
protecting the public right of access when it is 
consistent with ensuring the credibility of the 
judicial system, they are also quick to protect 
individuals from the exploitation of their personal 
information when it bears little relationship to 
ensuring the integrity of the judicial process. This 
common law and constitutional balance, carefully 
worked out on a case-by-case basis over the course 
of many years, represents the finest form of judicial 
lawmaking. 183 
3. Solove's Paradigm 
Professor Solove argues that the overarching problem in this 
area of law is what he refers to as the "secrecy paradigm." 184 This 
traditional concept of privacy revolves around secrecy and the idea 
that once information is disclosed, the privacy is IOSt.1 85 This 
model is embedded in our culture, as privacy is "often represented 
visually by a roving eye, an open keyhole, or a person peeking 
through Venetian blinds. Further, this paradigm explains why the 
Big Brother metaphor has become so widely used for depicting 
privacy problems." 186 
This paradigm has greatly influenced privacy law. 187 For 
example, in Fourth Amendment analyses the Supreme Court has 
held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in situations 
where something could have been seen or heard in public, or by a 
third person. 188 
183. /d. at 313-14. 
184. Solove, supra note 74, at 1176. 
185. /d. 
186. /d. at 1177. 
187. /d. 
188. [d. (citing Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding 
that "the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from 
navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment" due to 
the fact that the images are generally available to public view»; but see Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001) (holding that thermal imaging technology 
that allows insight into the home, into information that is not generally in public 
view is a violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also California v. Greenwood, 
486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in 
curbside garbage because it was made public to the trash collectors); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists in a pen register because the information is made public to phone 
company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in bank records because they are made public to the 
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The law treats prIvacy in a black-and-white manner, 
categorizing information as either wholly public or wholly 
private. 189 If information remains a secret, it will remain private, 
but once information becomes public, it will enter the public 
domain, will be available for any use, and can no longer be 
claimed to be private. 190 
While Professor So love urges a retreat from the traditional 
"secrec~ paradigm," the courts have been slow to make such a 
move. I I As the professor points out, in Scheetz v. Morning Cali, 
Inc., the court upheld the disclosure of a police report, alleging 
spousal abuse, to the press, despite the fact that no charges had 
been filed and that the married couple sought to keep the 
information private. 192 The court reasoned that "[t]he police could 
have brought charges without her concurrence, at which point all 
the information would have wound up on the public record, where 
it would have been non-confidential." 193 
The case law indicates that once personal information becomes 
public, or even could become public, it will rarely be 
constitutionally protected by the right to privacy. 194 Therefore, 
victim and witness information, once it becomes available in the 
public court record, according to the secrecy paradigm, will never 
be considered private again. 
D. Protection oj Personal InJormation in Terms oj the Driver's 
Privacy Act 
A major problem with the lack of privacy and the increased ease 
of access is that the personal information of victims and witnesses 
being disseminated, can and will be used for the purpose of 
intimidation or harassment. 195 The increased access that comes 
with electronic access can directly "facilitate blackmail, extortion, 
bank), limited by statute on other grounds as stated in Hancock v. Marshall, 86 
F.R.D. 209 (D.D.C. 1980). 
189. Solove, supra note 74, at 1177. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 1182, 1184. 
192. Id. at 1182 (citing Scheetz v. Morning Call Inc., 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
193. /d. (quoting Scheetz, 946 F.2d at 207). 
194. Id. (citing Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "one's 
criminal history is arguably not a 'private personal' matter at all, since arrest and 
conviction information are matters of public record"); Doe v. City of New York, 
15 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1994) ("An individual cannot expect to have a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in matters of public record.")). 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10. Professor Winn discusses the 
commercialization of the personal information found in court records as a major 
concern that comes with electronic dissemination. Winn, supra note 66, at 316. 
While this concern is the crux of many arguments against a shift from paper 
records, it is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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stalking, sexual assault, subornation of perjury, identity theft, and 
fraud." 196 
Personal infonnation is the most sensitive and the most likely to 
be subject to misuse. 197 In tenns of public court records, the 
personal infonnation that is of great concern to victims' rights 
advocates are the addresses and telephone numbers of the victims 
and witnesses who are named in the public record. 198 
In 1994, Congress addressed the issue of hann being facilitated 
by infonnation gathered from public records. 199 Congress 
considered a highly publicized case in which the actress Rebecca 
Shaeffer was shot and killed by a person who obtained her address 
through the California Department of Motor Vehicles. 200 In the 
House, there was a discussion of gangs who took license plate 
numbers of expensive cars, found out the addresses of the car 
owners through the DMV and robbed the houses. 201 In the Senate, 
there was an account of a California man who sent threatening 
letters to young women after using their license plate numbers to 
obtain their addresses from the DMV.202 
These cases involved infonnation culled from public records at 
state departments of motor vehicles and led to the passage of the 
Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994.203 However, the exact 
same infonnation, an individual's name and address, could have 
just as easily been obtained from court records. 204 "Personal 
infonnation that facilitates these kinds of wrongs should not be 
accessible to the public either at the courthouse or over the 
Internet. It places an individual in jeopardy of physical, 
psychological, and economic hann without furthering any of the 
benefits of public access to court records.,,205 
The purpose of public access to the court system is multi-
faceted. There is a government interest in promoting public trust 
and confidence in the court system and showing that the nation's 
laws are being upheld and enforced. 206 There is also an interest in 
educating citizens and keeping the public infonned as to how the 
196. Silvennan, supra note 32, at 206. 
197. Id. at 207. 
198. See Silvennan, supra note 32, at 207; Letter from Roberta Roper, supra note 2. 
199. Silvennan, supra note 32, at 207-08. 
200. 139 CONGo REC. 27, 327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran); Silvennan, supra 
note 32, at 207-08. 
201. 139 CONGo REC. 27, 327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran); Silvennan, supra 
note 32, at 207. 
202. 139 CONGo REc. 29,466 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer); Silvennan, supra note 
32, at 207. 
203. Silvennan, supra note 32, at 208. 
204. Id. 
205. /d. at 208-09. 
206. Id. at 209. 
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courts operate and what conclusions the courts have reached on the 
issues before them. 207 
Withholding sensitive personal information from 
the public when they access court records will 
neither undermine nor subvert any of these benefits. 
The adjudicatory facts upon which a court relies to 
dispose of a case or controversy according to the 
rule of law need never include the specific, 
arbitrarily assigned street address of a person's 
home, the precise series of numerals composing his 
or her telephone number, or the exact digits of his 
or her Social Security number. That a person has a 
Social Security number may be relevant to the just 
and rational disposition of a case, but the specific 
number will not be. Similarly, the general 
education that an individual might be expected to 
acquire from the perusal of court records does not 
include committing to memory the street addresses 
of fellow citizens, their Social Security numbers, or 
their bank accounts. Accordingly, such information 
should be omitted from publicly accessible court 
records and documents, irrespective of their form or 
the public's method of accessing them. 208 
E. Current Applicable Maryland Provisions 
1. Rule 16-1009-Preliminary Shielding Upon Motion 
Rule 16-1009 applies to court records irrespective of whether 
they are being accessed electronically or at the courthouse. 209 
Rule 16-1009 allows the court to deny the inspection of case 
records on a case-by-case basis. 2lo For the court to review a 
request for a denial of inspection of a case record, a motion must 
be filed by "[a] party to an action in which a case record is filed, 
including a person who has been permitted to intervene as a party, 
and a person who is the subject of or is specifically identified in a 
case record.,,211 Under this rule, a victim or witness who is named 
in a case record must file a motion which must be served on all 
parties to the action, if she wishes to have her address and 
telephone number kept out of the public court record. 212 After the 
207. Id. 
208. !d. at 209-10. 
209. See MD. R. 16-1008(a), 16-1009. 
210. MD. R. 16-1009. 
211. MD. R. 16-1009(a)(l). 
212. MD. R. 16-1009(a)(2). 
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victim files the motion, the record will be preliminarily shielded 
for five business days while the court determines whether or not to 
issue a temporary order precluding or limiting inspection. 213 This 
temporary order. will be .issued when an affidavit or statement 
under oath indicates that: 
(A) there is a substantial basis for believing that 
the case record is properly subject to an order 
precluding or limiting inspection, and (B) 
immediate, substantial, and irreparable harm will 
result to the person seeking the relief if temporary 
relief is not granted before a full adversary hearing 
can be held on the propriety of a final order 
precluding or limiting inspection. 214 
Following the issuance of the temporary order and a full 
adversary hearing, the court may issue a fmal order. 215 In making 
the determination of whether to issue a final order, the court shall 
consider anl "special or compelling reason[ s]" to limit 
inspection. 21 Under the Rules, a heavy burden rests on a person 
identified in the case record who wishes to have his personal 
information removed from the public record. 217 Additionally, this 
person carries the burden of acquiring information about the rights 
afforded to victims and witnesses and the possibility of having 
personal information shielded fr()m the public record. 218 
2. Amendment to Rule 16-1009-Shielding Upon Request 
In July 2006, the Maryland Court of Appeals amended Rule 16-
1009, allowing victims of domestic violence and victims who have 
acquired peace orders to have their information shielded upon 
"request," without filing a motion. 219 If the victim's request is 
granted, the shield on the personal information will remain "in 
effect until terminated or modified by order of court. If the request 
is denied, the person seeking to shield information may file a 
motion .... ,,226 A criminal witness or victim who is not a victim 
of domestic violence or who has not obtained a peace order must 
continue to file a motion, and will be unaffected by the July 2006 
Amendment. 221 
213. MD. R. 16-1009(b). 
214. MD. R. 16-1009(c)(2). 
215. MD. R. 16-1009(d). 
216. MD. R. 16-1009(d)(4). 
217. MD. R. 16-1009(d). 
218. See generally Eveleth, supra note II, at I. 
219. 33 Md. Reg. 1433 (Aug. 18,2006). 
220. [d. 
221. !d. 
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The Amendment to Rule 16-1009 makes it easier for certain 
victims to ask the court t.o shield their personal information from 
the public record, without going through the tedious process of 
filing a motion. 222 It also continues to place the burden on victims 
to take certain statutory steps in order to have their personal 
information withheld from the public record. 
3. Discovery Rules and the Coleman Case 
Coleman v. State223 is a case involving drug-related crimes.224 
"The case demonstrates the dominant extent to which the rampant 
illicit dealings in drugs have intruded, both flagrantly and 
insidiously, into the life of the community and the lives of the 
people.,,215 . 
The defendants in the case appealed the trial court's decision to 
withhold, from the defendants, the names of the prosecution's key 
witnesses. 226 The names of the witnesses were withheld because 
this was a classic case of witness intimidation.227 The applicable 
rule of discovery in this case is Rule 4-263(b)(1) which states that 
"upon the request of the defendant, the State's Attorney shall ... 
[d]isclose to the defendant the name and address of each person 
then known whom the State intends to call as a witness.,,228 
The broad exception to this rule is that the State is not required 
to disclose any "matter if the court finds that its disclosure would 
entail a substantial risk of harm to any person outweighing the 
interest in disclosure.,,229 In Coleman, the Court of Appeals used 
this exception to uphold the trial court's decision to withhold the 
witness information from the defendants.23o 
"The privilege of the State to withhold certain matters from 
defendants in criminal causes has long been recognized, not only 
in Maryland but throughout the country. The privilege is 
especially important in the enforcement of narcotic laws, since it is 
most difficult to obtain evidence for prosecutions.,,231 In this 
particular case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did 
not abuse her discretion when she did not allow the defendants 
discovery of the witness information. 232 The reasoning was that 
222. [d. 
223. 321 Md. 586, 583 A.2d 1044 (1991). 
224. [d. at 589, 583 A.2d at 1045. 
225. [d. at 589, 583 A.2d at 1045. 
226. [d. at 591; 583 A.2d at 1046. 
227. [d. at 595-96, 583 A.2d at 1048. 
228. MD. R. 4-263(b)(1). 
229. MD. R. 4-263(c)(3). 
230. Coleman, 321 Md. at 604,583 A.2d at 1052. 
231. [d. at 602, 583 A.2d at 1051 (citations omitted). 
232. [d. at 603, 583 A.2d at 1052. 
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the safety of the witnesses outweighed the rights of the defendants 
to have access to the names and addresses of the witnesses. 233 
This case indicates that once the names and addresses of 
witnesses become an issue, the burden will be on the defendants to 
show that their interest in obtaining the information outweighs the 
interest in keeping the information closed from discovery. 234 
However, in order to become an issue, the first and most important 
burden is on the victim or the witness to request that the 
information be protected from discovery and withheld from the 
court record. 235 
The discovery rules and the Coleman case must be considered 
together with Section 11-205 of the Maryland Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 
4. Sections 11-205 and 11-301 of the Maryland Code of Criminal 
Procedure 
The victim's burden is further cemented in sections 11-205 and 
11-301 of the Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure. 236 Section 
11-205 deals with requests made prior to trial. 237 The section 
states that: 
On request of the State, a victim of or witness to 
a felony or delinquent act that would be a felony if 
committed by an adult, or a victim's representative, 
a judge, State's Attorney, District Court 
commissioner, intake officer, or law enforcement 
officer may withhold the address or telephone 
number of the victim, victim's representative, or 
witness before the trial or adjudicatory hearing in a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding, unless a judge 
determines that good cause has been shown for the 
release of the information. 238 
Similarly, section 11-301 deals with motions made during a 
trial. 239 
233. Id. 
234. See supra notes 228-229. 
235. See supra note 231. In Coleman, the State made the request to withhold the 
witness information because of the obvious witness intimidation aspect of the 
case. Id. It is in situations where witness or victim privacy is not evident to the 
prosecutor that the burden falls solely on the shoulders of the witnesses and 
victims to see to it that their personal information is withheld from the public 
record. 
236. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 11-205, 11-301 (West 2005). 
237. Id. § 11-205. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. § 11-301. 
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On motion of the State or on request of a victim 
or witness, during a criminal trial or a juvenile 
delinquency adjudicatory hearing, a court may 
prohibit the release of the address or telephone 
number of the victim or witness unless the court 
determines that good cause is shown for the release 
of the information. 240 
447 
While these sections give the court the discretion to withhold 
victim and witness information, the discretion is not triggered until 
a request is made. 241 As a practical matter, this places the burden 
on the victims or witnesses to proactively prevent their personal 
information from becoming a part of the public court record. 
Although the statutes and discovery rules indicate that once victim 
and witness information is of issue before the court, the burden 
will shift to the defendant to show why the information should be 
in the record, the first burden is on the victim or witness to seek 
advice as to his rights and then to make the appropriate request. 242 
IV. SOLUTION-SHIFTING THE BURDEN 
The Maryland Code, in conjunction with Maryland Rule 16-
1009, shows that the addresses and telephone numbers of victims 
and witnesses are presumed to be open to the public. 243 The 
Maryland Rules also indicate that with the advent of new 
technologies this information will be available electronically from 
remote locations. 244 
While the Rules Committee has adopted amendments that 
would limit the electronic availability of victim and witness 
information, and that allow victims and witnesses to request to 
have their information shielded, it has done nothing to remedy the 
root of the problem. The basic burden is still placed on the victims 
or witnesses to have their personal information blocked from the 
public record. 245 
Electronic access to victim and witness telephone numbers and 
addresses is simply a publicized mutation of a larger problem of 
general public access to this information. In order to solve the 
problem, the legislature should go beyond the approach taken by 
the amendments to the Rules and the proposed legislation. While 
these solutions narrowly protect victims and witnesses from remote 
access problems, they should give the victims and witnesses broad 
240. !d. 
241. Id. §§ 11-205, 11-301. 
242. Id.; supra Part lIl(E); see generally Eveleth, supra note II, at I. 
243. Supra note 121. 
244. Supra note 127. 
245. See supra Part lIl(E). 
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protection by placing the burden on the defendant to show why the 
personal information is vital to the court record. 
This goal can be accomplished by changing the language of 
sections 11-205 and 11-301. Both sections currently state that the 
addresses and telephone numbers of victims and witnesses "may" 
be withheld from the court record upon request. 246 This wording 
places the burden on the innocent victim or witness to see to it that 
information be withheld. 247 As most victims and witness are not 
represented by counsel, it is unrealistic to assume that innocent 
people who find themselves in the middle of the criminal justice 
system, as non-parties, will have the knowledge to request that 
their personal information be withheld from the record. As the 
system stands, the addresses and telephone numbers of 
unrepresented victims and witnesses are being disseminated in the 
court record due to the fact that the citizenry is not aware of the 
need to make the appropriate requests. 
The burden must be shifted away from the unrepresented non-
parties to defendants who often have a Constitutional right to be 
represented by counsel. Sections 11-205 and 11-301 should be 
replaced with a statute that reads: 
On motion of the defendant, prior to or during a 
criminal trial or a juvenile delinquency adjudicatory 
hearing, a court may permit the release of the 
address or telephone number of the victim or 
witness if the court determines that good cause is 
shown for the release of the information. 
This proposal creates a presumption that victim or witness 
addresses and telephone numbers will not be a part of the court 
record. It does not disturb a defendant's right to confrontation, as 
the victims' and witnesses' names will remain part of the court 
record. The only aspects of the record that would be withheld are 
the actual numbers that constitute the victims' or witnesses' 
telephone numbers and street addresses. The benefit of this 
withholding will be increased privacy for the innocent third parties 
who are neither defendants nor prosecutors in the criminal justice 
system. 
This change would not conflict with the general presumption of 
openness, as the integral parts of the court record would remain 
accessible to the public, both at the courthouse and electronically. 
It would, however, shift the burden from the victim or witness, to 
the defendant, to prove that the telephone number and address of 
the victim or witness is crucial to the record. 
246. Supra note 236. 
247. See supra Part III(E)(3). 
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The change to the criminal procedure code would allow the 
move toward electronic and remote access to occur without 
endangering the rights and welfare of victims and witnesses. The 
change would also allow victims and witnesses to move on after 
their innocent involvement in the criminal justice system, without 
their privacy being forever lost with their personal information 
being unnecessarily included as a part of the public record. 
John Losinger 
